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JOHN MARSHALL IN PERSPECTIVE* 
BY DuDLEY W. WooDBRIDGE 
Dean, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary 
We are met this morning to pay homage to one of 
America's greatest Americans-a man whom we at William 
and Mary regard as our greatest alumnus-a man whom 
your great College honors with his name. 
Born in Virginia two hundred years ago this Septem-
ber 24th, John Marshall served under George Washington, 
first as Lieutenant, and later as Captain. He saw and par-
ticipated in the terrible suffering of the Continental troops 
at Valley Forge. 
But John Marshall is not primarily honored and re-
membered today because he was a soldier or an athlete or 
a diplomat. "By their fruits shall you know them," or in 
Marshall's case by his acts-by his decis-ions on great ques-
tions of Constitutional Law--do we know him. He was 
aptly designated by his great colleague, Mr. Justice Story, 
as the "Expounder of the Constitution." 
The Constitution of Soviet Russia like our own Con-
stitution guarantees freedom of speech. Section 125 of the 
Soviet Constitution reads in part: 
In conformity with the interests of the toilers and to the end 
of strengthening the socialistic social order, citizens of the 
U.S.S.R. are guaranteed by law: (a) freedom of speech, (b) free-
dom of the press, (c) freedom of assembly meetings, and freedom 
of street parades and demonstrations. 
While the Constitutions are_ substantially the same, there 
is a great difference, for the interpretation of a constitution 
is just as much a part of it as the language itself. To the 
Soviet mind freedom of expression simply does not include 
the right to criticize the Government. That is as much a 
*An address delivered at Franklin and Marshall College, September 
15, 1955 at exercises held by the College, in conjunction with the 
Lancaster Bar Association, to honor the memory of one of its founding 
namesakes. 
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rule with them as it is with us that freedom of speech does 
not give one the right falsely to cry out "Fire!" "Fire!" 
in a crO\vded theatre. In other \VOrds freedom of expression 
in Russia is freedom to praise or criticize what the ruling 
classes \Vant praised or criticized. 
That the same words mean vastly different things to 
different people is perfectly illustrated by the almost infinite 
number of interpretations of the Bible. Fortunately for us 
today, no one can force his interpretation of the Bible on 
others as the only true one. In the case of our Constitution 
there have been vast differences of opinion. But while our 
Government does not compel us to live by the Bible, we are 
compelled to live by our Constitution, and, therefore, it is 
of great importance that we have the best possible way of 
knowing what our Constitution means. 
The Executive is bound by the Constitution and the 
Congress is bound by the Constitution just as much as are 
all the courts. It is then quite logical to reason that in 
executive matters the President is the one who determines 
what he can or cannot do under the Constitution, that in 
Legislative matters the Congress determines what laws it 
can constitutionally pass, and that in matters purely judicial 
the Supreme Court of the United States determines what 
can or cannot be done. The Constitution of the United 
States itself does not expressly cover this most important 
matter, but since each branch of the Government is on an 
equality with the other two branches how could one branch 
be superior to the others, and, in effect, exercise a veto 
over what the ·other co-ordinate branches wish to do? 
The first and the most famous of Marshall's Constitu-
tional Law Cases I wish to comment on this morning is the 
case of Marbury v. Madison in which the Supreme Court 
decided that it had the last word on what can be consti-
tutionally done not only by the courts, but by the Congress, 
and by implication, the Executive. 
One of the last acts of the Federalist administration 
of John Adams was the issuance of some commissions to 
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several persons, one of whom was Marbury, empowering 
them to be Justices of the Peace in the District of Columbia. 
Although these commissions had been duly signed and 
sealed they had not been actually delivered. The new Re-
publican administration now headed by Thomas Jefferson 
declined to deliver the commissions. An Act of Congress 
then in force authorized the Supreme Court to "issue writs 
of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and usages 
of law, to any courts appointed or persons holding office, 
under authority of the United States." So Mr. Marbury 
applied to the Supreme Court of the United States for a 
writ of mandamus ordering the Secretary of State to deliver 
his commission to him. 
Now whether Mr. Marbury was given his commission 
or not made little or no difference to the Country and 
probably little or no difference to himself. Whether the 
Supreme Court could give orders to the President and the 
Secretary of State acting pursuant to the orders of the 
Pr-esident was a matter of some moment especially when the 
Court and the President were not seeing eye to eye on many 
matters. There was even some talk of impeachment if the 
Court issued the writ. And if the Court failed to issue the 
writ, it would seem to thereby decide by implication that it 
had no powers over the executive branch of the Govern-
ment even though it was clearly acting illegally. Thus Chief 
Justice Marshall found himself in a dilemma-possibility 
of impeachment if he issued the writ; abject surrender if he 
did not issue the writ. His escape from the dilemma is one 
of the cleverest master strokes of judicial history. 
He decided three things : First, that Marbury was en-
titled to the commission. He lectured the President ior iai1-
ure to respect Marbury's vested rights telling him that 
America was a Government of laws and not of men. He 
then stated that mandamus was the proper remedy to compel 
the performance of public ministerial acts. He disclaimed 
any intention or any authority to control the discretion of 
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the executive. It seemed to follow from what he had said 
that he was going to grant the \Vrit of Mandamus, but 
instead he surprised his adYersaries by deciding that the 
Act of Congress conferring original jurisdiction on the 
Supreme Court of the United States was in conflict with 
the Federal Constitution. That document (article III, Sec-
tion 2) gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction ( 1) 
in all cases affecting ambassadors, other Public Ministers 
and Consuls, and (2) in those cases where a State shall be 
a party. It then provides that in all other cases arising in 
the Federal Courts it shall haYe appellate jurisdiction. Since 
issuing writs of mandamus at the request of individuals 
does not affect Ambassadors, Public Ministers, or Consuls, 
nor involve any State, he held the Act of Congress null and 
void as being in conflict with the Constitution. In words that 
have rung down the centuries, "It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases 
must of necessity expound and interpret the rule. If two 
laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the 
operation of each. So if the law be in opposition to the 
Constitution; if both the law and the Constitution apply 
to a particular case, so that the court must either decide the 
case, conformable to the law, disregarding the Constitution; 
or conformable to the Constitution, disregarding the law; 
the court must determine which of these conflicting laws 
governs the case; this is of the yery essence of judicial duty. 
If then, the courts are to regard the Constitution, and the 
Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legis-
lature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must 
govern the case to which they both apply." 
Please note that Marshall established the principle of 
judicial supremacy (a) without citing a single authority, 
(b) in a case of very little significance in and of itself, (c) 
deciding the case according to the wishes of the party then 
in power, (d) but lecturing them on the moral duties that 
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party had violated. As a result of all this, there was prac-
tically no objection from the Country as a whole to the 
doctrine of judicial supremacy laid down therein. Rather 
the court's opponents directed their fire at its criticism of 
the Republican administration. 
One shudders to think as to what might have happened 
had the Court waited to establish the principle of judicial 
supremacy until some red-hot issue divided the Country, 
as say the Dred Scott Case, and the Court then for the first 
time asserted such a right. And let us not forget that there 
were many who took the view that each sovereign state had 
the right to determine for itself what acts of Congress were 
valid and what acts were not. It requires no imagination 
to see what intolerable confusion would have resulted had 
the Court not taken a firm stand at the opportune time. It 
is of interest to note that no other act of Congress was held 
invalid until the ill-fated Dred Scott Decision of 1857. Dur-
ing a period of 166 years the Supreme Court of the United 
States has disposed of more than 55,000 cases. In only 79 
of these has it held that Acts of Congress were unconstitu-
tional. 
But the doctrine of Judicial supremacy still has its foes. 
In the February, 1955 issue of the American Bar Associa-
tion Journal a lawyer and a former judge, Everett C. 
McKeage of San Francisco, writes of the Segregation Case 
(although he is personally opposed to segregation) (and 
you can im<lgine what he would have written if he was a 
strong believer in segregation), quote "Here again we have 
the example as stated by the late Chief Justice Stone of 
that Court when he critically said to his brother Justices, 
'The only restraint we know is our own selt-restraint.' ... 
History teaches us that the Supreme Court of the United 
States, by its decisions, determines for itself its own author-
ity and power in cases before it and amends the Federal 
Constitution by such decisions just as surely as though 
amended by the process and procedure provided for in the 
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Constitution. As ~Ir. Justice Holmes so aptly put it, that 
Court sits as a continuing constitutional convention. The 
Federal Constitution is whatever the Justices of that Court 
say it is .... No lawyer will deny that the Supreme Court, 
on many occasions, has overruled its former decisions on 
constitutional issues, just as in the instant case on segrega-
tion, thus making the meaning of the Constitution depend 
upon the indiYidual views of its members. \Vhat was per-
fectly constitutional yesterday becomes heresy today just 
because nine judges (or eYen five, or three) say that it is. 
If this sort of thing is not a government of men, then I do 
not understand what that expression means. This is judi-
cial omnipotence 'run wild'. 
" ... I say that these issues are far too important for 
a majority of nine judges to be the final authority on, it 
matters not how able, patriotic, and profound they may be. 
I stand with Thomas Jefferson, .:\ndrew Jackson, Abraham 
Lincoln and Theodore Roose,·elt on this vital subject." (End 
of quote) 
But someone has to decide what law is supreme, 
Should it be the legislature which is most sensitive to the 
immediate popular prejudices? Should it be one man only, 
the President, or should it be by a majority of the Supreme 
Court which is at least one step removed from immediate 
popular passions, is disinterested, and has control of neither 
the public purse nor the military. Most people today (and 
I number myself among them) believe that our liberties, 
our rights, and our property are most secure if such a 
power is in the Courts where Chief Justice John ~Iarshall 
put it in Jf arbury 'iJ. Jf adison. 
Beveridge in his life of John ~Iarshall says, "This prin-
ciple ( ot Judicial Supremacy) is wholly and exclusi\·e\y 
American. It is America's original contribution to the sci-
ence of law. The assertion of it, under the conditions 
was the deed of a great man." 
?\ow permit me to turn from the political to the eco-
nomic. In any society based on the division of labor the 
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interchange of products is its one most important economic 
necessity. Article I, Section 8 of the Federal Constitution 
reads in part : 
"The Congress shall have Power ... To Regulate Commerce 
with Foreign Nations, and among the several States, and .with 
the Indian Tribes." 
You will note that it does not say that the States do not 
also ha\·c such a power, and the term "Commerce" is not 
defined. One of the chief reasons for the establishment of 
the Constitution was the necessity of regulating Commerce 
between the several states. Local tariffs and other dis-
criminatory measures had given rise to sharp controversies 
during the period of the Articles of Confederation. The first 
important case to reach the United States Supreme Court 
on the subject of commerce among the several states was 
the case of Gi!Jbons v. Ogden, some 35 years after the 
adoption of the Constitution. 
The State of New York had granted Messieurs Fulton 
and Livingston a monopoly or exclusive right to operate 
steamboats in the navigable waters in the State of New York 
between the City of New York and points in the State of 
New Jersey. Ogden was an assignee of this right. Gibbons, 
in violation of Ogden's right, was operating two steamboats, 
and Ogden sought to enjoin him from so doing. The prob-
lem seems a simple one to us today, largely because of 
Marshall's reasoning in the final decision, but the most 
learned men in the law of New Y ark, including her Chancel-
lor Kent-the author of Kent's Commentaries, second only 
to Blackstone in the United States, held that the New York 
law was valid and that Gibbons had no right to operate the 
vessels within the State of New York, even though he had 
a federal license to engage in the coasting trade. It was 
urged by the proponents of the monopoly that the United 
States Constitution should be interpreted strictly, that 
"commerce" as used in the Constitution referred only to the 
interchange of goods and not to navigation, and that while 
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the State of New York could not levy a tariff on goods 
imported from New Jersey, it could require such goods to be 
carried on vessels owned and operated by citizens of the 
State of New York. The case was argued by some of the 
most prominent lawyers of the day. Daniel \\rebster, \Villiam 
vVirt, David B. Ogden, Thomas J. Oakley. You will note 
that the question involved was not to what extent Congress 
can regulate interstate commerce positiYely, but to what 
extent has the grant of the power to Congress taken that 
power from the states. Chief Justice John ).farshall held 
that the term "commerce" includes more than the mere 
traffic in goods. 
"Commerce," he said, "undoubtedly is traffic, but it is some-
thing more-it is intercourse. It describes the commercial inter-
course between nations, and parts of nations, i11 all its branches, 
and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that inter-
course." (Emphasis added) 
He held that the people of eyery portion of every state 
have a right to engage in commerce in all its branches, that 
commerce included navigation; that such a right is a federal 
right, and that the power to regulate commerce given to the 
Congress "is complete in itself, may be exercised to its 
utmost extent, and acknowledged no limitations, other than 
are prescribed in the Constitution." He also laid down the 
principle that where there is a conflict or collision between 
a state statute and a federal statute, the federal statute must 
prevail so long as the federal statute does not ,·iolate the 
federal Constitution. 
As to whether the Constitution should be strictly con-
strued, John Marshall had this to say: 
"This instrument (the Constitution) contains an enumeration 
of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. 
It has been said that these powers ought to be construed strictly. 
But why ought they to be so construed ? . . . X or is there one 
sentence in the Constitution ... that prescribes this rttle. 'Ne do 
not, therefore, think ourselves justified in adopting it. 'Vhat do 
gentlemen mean, by a strict construction? If they contend only 
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against that enlarged construction, wl1ich would extend words 
beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the 
application of the term, but should not controvert the principle. 
If they contend for that narrow construction which . . . would 
deny the government those powers which the words grant, as usu-
ally understood, impart, ... for that narrow construction, which 
would cripple the government, and render it unequal to the objects 
ior which it is declared to be instituted, ... then we cannot per-
cciYe the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as the 
rule by which the Constitution is to be expounded, as men whose 
intentions require no concealment, generally employ the words 
which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to 
convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and 
the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed 
words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they 
ha\·e said .... \\'e know of no rule for construing the extent 
of such powers, other than is given by the language of the instru-
ment, \Yhich confers them, taken in connection with the purposes 
ior which they were conferred." 
cnlike the case of Marbury v. Madiso11, the decision of 
Gibbous Y. Ogde1t attracted a great deal of attention and 
there were immediate repercussions both favorable and un-
ia,·orable. These repercussions are still with us today. 
Those who opposed the New York steamboat monopoly 
were jubilant. This was the first great ''trust" decision in 
America. Those who feared that states would be deprived of 
their pmvcr over the commerce in slaves were alarmed, and 
Thomas Jefferson, then eighty-two years of age, was 
horrified. In a letter to \Villiam B. Giles (a year before 
Jefferson's death) he wrote : 
"I sec, as you do, and with the deepest affliction, the rapid 
strides with which the Federal branch of our government is 
adyancing towards the usurpation ·of all the rights reserved to 
the States, and the consolidation in itself of all powers, foreign and 
domestic; and that, too, hy construction which, if legitimate, leave 
no limits to their powers .... it is hut too e\"ident that the three 
ruling branches (of the federal government) are in combination 
to strip their colleagues, the State authorities, of the powers re-
sen-ed by them, and to exercise themsch·es all functions foreign 
and domestic. Under the power to regulate commerce, they assume 
indefinitely that also over agriculture and manufacturers ... " 
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Charles \Varren in his History of the American Bar 
comments: 
"But economic results of more far-reaching intportance than 
the mere demolition of the (steamboat) monopoly were in-
volved, which were not appreciated until later years. The opening 
of the Hudson River and Long Island Sound to the free passage 
of steamboats was the most potent factor in the building up of 
New York as a commercial center. The removal of danger of 
similar grants of railroad monopolies in other states promoted 
immensely the development of interstate communication by steam 
throughout the country .... In short :Marshall's opinion was the 
emancipation proclamation of American Commerce." 
This decision has made possible a national economy 
which is the admiration and envy- of the \Vorld. But the 
precise limits of federal control over commerce have not 
yet been marked out. Decade after decade there has been an 
increasing federal control. As society becomes more and 
more complex and we become more and more interdependent, 
we must have more and more regulations. It certainly takes 
more rules to operate properly a railroad or an airport than 
it does a small private garage. 
Now let us note some of the most important constitu-
tional law decisions that have further developed and refined 
the doctrines laid down in Gib"'Jo11s v. Ogden. 
After holding for scores of years that insurance was 
not commerce (Contracts of insurance "are not commodities 
to be shipped or forwarded from one State to another, and 
then put up for sale") the Supreme Court reversed itself in 
1941. In other words insurance is just as much commerce 
as is navigation. But baseball. Ah! There is another ques-
tion. Baseball is a game. 
In lF i/son ". N C"& decided in 1917 it was held that 
Congress could fi" the standards of hours and wages on the 
Nation's Railroads as a means of pre\'enting a threatened 
general strike. 
In the so-called Lottery cases decided in 1903, it was 
held that Congress in the exercise of its power to regulate 
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interstate commerce, might prohibit the transportation of 
articles, such as lottery tickets, which have only a moral 
relationship to commerce, i.e., articles which can not injure 
other goods in transit but can only accomplish their baneful 
effect within the state into which they are transported. Cer-
tainly the moral aspects of commerce are just as much the 
concern of the whole country as are its financial aspects. 
And now come the Child Labor Cases. In 1916 Congress 
prohibited the transportation in interstate commerce of the 
products of any mine, quarry, mill, cannery, or factory, in 
which within thirty days prior to its removal therefrom 
children under the age of 14 had been permitted to work. 
By a five to four decision the Act of Congress was declared 
invalid because it was not intended as a regulation of inter-
state commerce but as a regulation of child labor-a matter 
for each state to determine for itself. This decision was 
over-ruled in United States v. Darby in 1944. Said the 
Court: 
· "The motive and purpose of the present regulation is plainly 
to make effective the Congressional conception of public policy 
that interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of 
competition in distribution of goods produced under sub-standard 
labor conditions, which competition is injurious to the commerce 
and to the states from and to which the commerce flows." 
The same principle is applicable to goods produced by 
convict labor. In Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v. Illinois 
Central Railway Co. decided in 1937, a congressional act 
making it unlawful knowingly to transport in interstate 
commerce goods made by convict labor into any State where 
the goods are intended to be received, sold, or used in viola-
tion of its laws was upheld as a valid regulation of interstate 
commerce. 
And the same for farming. Congress, in the exercise 
of the power to regulate interstate commerce, may limit the 
production of crops and impose fines for production in excess 
of quotas. 
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And Congress under its commerce powers may even 
regulate intrastate freight rates where they affect interstate 
rates. 
In the Morgan case it was held that a Virginia statute 
segregating bus passengers according to race in interstate 
trips was void because it was a burden on interstate com-
merce to compel "any passenger to change his or her seat as 
it may be necessary or proper" to preserve the status of 
segregation on the trip. "It seems clear to us," said the 
majority of the court, "that seating arrangements for the 
different races in interstate motor travel require a single 
uniform rule to promote and protect national travel." 
Just one more case on commerce, and then I am through 
pointing out the superstructure that has been built on 
Gibbons v. Ogden. 
Vvere you, or your parents, broke and out of work in 
1939? Suppose the answer is "yes." Suppose you wanted to 
start life anew in that fairy land of sunshine and opportunity 
known as California. Thousands of people tried that very 
thing. As a result staggering problems of health, decency, 
and finance resulted. California, in desperation, passed its 
"Anti-Oakie Law" by which it attempted to keep indigent 
persons out of the State. 
Held this cannot constitutionally be done. It is an 
interference with interstate commerce. In the words of Mr. 
Justice Cardozo, (and it was the philosophy of John Mar-
shall) "(The Constitution) was framed upon the theory 
· that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim 
together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation 
are in unison and not division." 
So under the Commerce Power Congress has been able 
to legislate against monopoly; control to a considerable 
extent the business of insurance and navigation, and the 
occupation of mining; manufacturing; and agriculture; and 
regulate to a considerable degree even our morals and our 
local economies. 
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I do not join with those who think that this is all bad. 
Some things affect the national economy as a whole-far 
more now than in 1789-and when they do, planning on a 
national scale is just as essential for the best interests of all 
as are zoning laws on a local scale for the planning of a city. 
John :Marshall had courage of the highest order. He 
had physical courage as evidenced by his valor and his forti-
tude as a soldier. He had moral courage as evidenced by 
his conduct of the trial of Aaron Burr for treason. As Chief 
Justice his stature was so great that nine people out of ten, 
perhaps, take it for granted that he was the first Chief 
Justice when in reality he was the fourth-preceded by John 
Jay, who thought so ill of the Court that he resigned to 
become governor of New York, John Rutledge who thought 
so little of the Court that he had once resigned as an 
associate justice to serve as Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina, and by Oliver Ellsworth. 
It was Marshall, more than any other one man, who 
placed the judiciary on an actual equality with the legislature 
and the President; who made it possible for us to have 
liberty under law even as against the Congress and the Chief 
Executive; and who formulated the policies that have re-
sulted in a strong national economy without which we could 
nner have become a first class world power. 
In the perspective of time we now see clearly that John 
Marshall was no fleeting comet that flashes across the 
heavens, he was no satellite or planet that shines only in the 
reflected light of far greater forces, but a fixed star of the 
first magnitude whose atomic light reaches us today as un-
diminished as at the time of his death some one hundred 
twenty years ago. 
It is a fine thing for the American Bar, and for you of 
Franklin and l\Iarshall College, to be associated with the 
name of such a man, but it is still a finer thing to be guided 
and inspired by his example and his light! 
